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Introduction
A sizeable body of literature deals with the political determination of the characteristics of a public pay-as-you-go pension system. The seminal paper by Browning (1975) assumed that the only heterogeneity between voters is their age. Subsequent papers (such as Casamatta et al. (2000a) ) have enriched this approach by assuming that agents also di¤er in income or in productivity. This richer set of individual traits has allowed these papers to study the determination of both the size of the pension system and of its redistributiveness across income levels. As for the latter, the literature (surveyed by Galasso and Profeta (2002) ) has contrasted so-called Bismarckian systems, where the pension bene…t is proportional to the individual contribution, with Beveridgean systems, where the bene…t is based on the average contribution.
The main stylized fact in this domain is that Bismarckian systems tend to be larger (as measured by either the contribution rate or the share of public pensions in GDP) than Beveridgean ones: see Table 1 labor supply, and obtain that larger labor supply distortions generated by the ‡at-rate
Beveridgean pension system versus the earnings-related Bismarckian one, may explain why more redistributive systems are smaller. Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007) study the simultaneous determination of the size and type of pensions system. In their model, agents di¤er in age, income and in ability to invest in the capital market. With only three income groups, a small Beveridgean system is supported by low-income agents, who gain from its redistributive feature, and high-income individuals, who seek to minimize their tax contribution and to invest their resources in a private scheme. Middle income individuals, instead, favor a large Bismarckian system. The degree of inequality in earnings and the level of capital market returns determine which type of equilibrium emerges.
An important dimension of heterogeneity among voters, which may play a critical role in the determination of the pension system, is absent from these studies: longevity. It is well known empirically how people of the same age di¤er in life expectancy.
Moreover, life expectancy is positively correlated with income or wealth, as shown by Deaton and Paxon (1999) for the US, Attanasio and Emerson (2001) for the UK, and Reil-Held (2000) for Germany. Average life expectancy has been increasing in most countries for at least half a century. But these increases have not been shared equally everywhere. For instance, in the US, the average male life expectancy at 65 has increased from 15 to 16.1 years between 1986 and 2006 for individuals in the bottom half of the earnings distribution, but from 16.5 to 21.5 years in the top half of the earnings distribution (Waldron, 2007) . It is thus important to assess the impact of such variations on pension programs. This paper studies how and to what extent di¤erences in longevity can contribute to explaining two main questions. First, why some countries (such as France or Germany) have a mostly contributive (Bismarckian) public pension system, while others (such as the UK or Canada) develop a mainly non-contributive (Beveridgean) system. Second, why Beveridgean systems tend to be smaller than Bismarckian ones. Tackling these questions requires building a political economy model with a bidimensional type space (income or productivity and life expectancy) and a bidimensional policy space (size and degree of redistributiveness of the public pension program), where both policy dimensions are chosen at the majority. Consequently, we need to go further than providing comparative static results showing how the size depends on the exogenous type of the system.
To the best of our knowledge, no paper has yet attempted to build such a model. "collective annuities"as currently provided by public pension systems when individuals di¤er in longevity (as well as in productivity). 1 Their approach is normative and based on a utilitarian social welfare function. They contrast two schemes: a pure contributory (Bismarckian) pension and a ‡at rate (Beveridgean) pension. They show that the case for collective annuities is stronger when they are associated with a ‡at pension system. 2 Other papers take a positive perspective. Leroux (2010) studies the case where individuals have the same income but di¤er in their life span. She obtains that a majority of voters are in favor of a pension system awarding the same annuity to everyone if the distribution of longevity is negatively-skewed. Borck (2007) assumes from the outset that richer individuals always live longer lives (so that heterogeneity between agents is truly one dimensional) and shows how individual preferences and equilibrium pension policies are a¤ected by the slope of the relationship between income and life expectancy. Finally, De Donder and Hindriks (2002) assume that individuals di¤er both in their productivity and survival probabilities. They focus on the majority chosen size of the pension system as a function of its (exogenous) redistributiveness. They show that the equilibrium amount of distortions associated to the pension system need not decrease when the system is exogenously made less redistributive, because voters react by increasing the pension system's size. 3 Finally, some papers take a purely empirical path and study the empirical con- for France and Reil-Held (2000) for Germany. These papers take the existing characteristics of the pension system as given and assess how the joint distribution of income and life expectancy a¤ects its redistributiveness across income levels. Not surprisingly, they …nd that, with public pensions not related to individual longevity, the positive correl-ation between income and longevity reduces signi…cantly the amount of redistribution across income levels.
We assume that individuals live at most two periods, and di¤er in productivity and in probability to be alive in the second period. In the …rst period, they choose how much to work and to save. In the second period, they retire, consume their saving and the pension bene…t (if any), which is …nanced by a linear payroll tax on labor income. Pension bene…ts are paid out as a collective annuity 4 with both a (Bismarckian) contributive and a (Beveridgean) non-contributive component. Voters choose both the generosity (or size) of the pension system (the value of the proportional income tax rate) and its degree of redistributiveness (or type, measured by the relative importance of the contributive component, i.e., the Bismarckian parameter).
We study the joint political determination of the size and type of the collective annuity program. It is well know that simultaneous voting over a bidimensional policy space has generically no equilibrium (see De Donder et al. (2012) for instance). We adopt the voting procedure …rst proposed by Kramer (1972) and Shepsle (1979) , where each policy dimension is a majority voting equilibrium given the other dimension. We obtain that the median productivity voter is decisive in the choice of both size and type of pension system. We show the existence of a unique Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium, with the following properties. If the Bismarckian return is larger than the interest rate, the unique equilibrium is a large, mostly but not always exclusively Bismarckian program. If the Bismarckian return is smaller than the interest rate (because of a large correlation between income and life expectancy, for instance), the unique equilibrium depends on the median productivity level in the economy. If this productivity level is small, the unique equilibrium is a smaller and purely Beveridgean pension, while there is no collective annuity program at equilibrium with a large median productivity. These Shepsle equilibria correspond to the empirically observed large Bismarckian systems and 4 We concentrate on the case where there is no private (individual) annuity market. This is in line with the empirical evidence, since most retirees are reluctant to buy an annuity, so much so that this behavioral pattern is often referred to as the "annuity puzzle"; see Brown et al. (2005) . Poterba (2002, 2004) and Mitchell (1996) show that where they exist, rates of return of individual annuities are much below actuarially fair levels and often signi…cantly less attractive than the implicit return of collective annuities. smaller Beveridgean ones.
Next we study how this political equilibrium is a¤ected by variations in the longevity distribution. Both a larger positive correlation between income and longevity, and a larger average life expectancy when uncorrelated with income generate a more redistributive equilibrium pension program, although sometimes at the expense of its size.
Consequently, taking theses induced changes in the system into account, their net impact on the amount of redistribution operated by collective annuities is not necessarily negative.
Our analytical results show that the political equilibrium crucially depends on key parameters such as the interest rate, the productivity and longevity distributions and their correlation. In Section 7 we illustrate these results with simulations calibrated to re ‡ect the stylized facts in two countries, namely France and the UK. The results show that our model is consistent with the relevant empirical …ndings, namely a Bismarckian system for France and a Beveridgean system for the UK. Though admittedly highly stylized, our simple model thus provides a possible explanation for the main features of the retirement systems in these two countries. We also use the calibrated example to study some comparative statics properties of the political equilibrium. Part of the results provide mainly an illustration of our analytical …ndings. In addition, the simulations also allow us to study scenarios for which no analytical results could be obtained. For instance, we examine the impact of an increase in average life expectancy when wage and longevity are positively correlated.
The model
Consider an economy consisting of a continuum of agents who live (at most) two periods, working in the …rst period and retiring in the second one. Individuals di¤er in productivity w and in life expectancy, measured as the probability p to be alive in period 2. 5 The joint distribution of these two characteristics is denoted by H(w; p), However, to interpret our results we will concentrate on the empirically most relevant case where productivity and life expectancy are positively correlated. The average productivity is denoted by w while the average survival probability is p. We assume as usual that the productivity distribution is positively skewed, so that the median productivity, w med is lower than the average, w.
Individual preferences are given by
where c is …rst-period consumption, d is second-period consumption, h(z) measures the disutility of supplying the labor quantity z and is the discount rate. The function u is increasing and concave while h is increasing and convex with h(0) = 0. First-period consumption net of labor supply disutility is denoted by x = c h(z).
Individuals take two private decisions, both in their …rst period of life: labor supply z and saving, s. The labor supply choice can be interpreted as either at the intensive (number of hours worked) or extensive margin (such as the retirement age). 6 We assume away any borrowing constraint, so that saving can be negative. 7 Saving has a gross return of 1 + r, where r > 0 denotes the exogenous world interest rate. 8 The …rst-period individual budget constraint is given by
where 2 [0; 1] is the payroll tax rate.
In their second period, individuals retire and consume their private saving and a 6 If agents retire before the end of the …rst period, they do not collect any bene…t before the beginning of the second period. 7 The assumption that agents can borrow against future retirement income is of course a strong assumption, made to simplify the algebra. As we explain in the concluding section, imposing borrowing constraints would decrease the most-preferred tax rate of some voters, but would not a¤ect the qualitative results we obtain. 8 In other words we consider a "small" open economy. Because of capital mobility this assumption appears to be reasonable for essentially all European countries, but it may be debatable for the US. An alternative interpretation of this assumption, in line with Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) , is to say that the interest rate is controlled by policy instruments (like public debt) which are not accounted for in our setting. 
where Ewz is the average …rst-period income, 9 1= p is the internal rate of return of the non-contributory (Beveridgean) collective annuity while 1=p witĥ p = Epwz Ewz is the internal rate of return of the contributory (Bismarckian) collective annuity. The two components of the collective annuity di¤er in both their internal rate of return and the basis on which this return is applied. Both components redistribute from shortlived to long-lived agents (since both are based on some aggregate rather than individual longevity), while the non-contributory part also redistributes across income levels.
All decisions (public and private) are taken by agents in the …rst period of their life: they …rst vote over the size ( ) and type ( ) of the collective annuity program, observe the result of the vote and then decide how much to work (z) and to save (s) privately. 10 9 Throughout the paper, Ef denotes R f (w; p)dH(w; p) for any function f . Similarly, cov(f; g) denotes E(f g) E(f )E(g) for any functions f and g.
1 0 Throughout the paper, we assume that only young people vote, and that the majority-chosen policy remains in place when they retire. With a pay-as-you-go collective annuity program, the voting behavior of retirees is well known. They favor the proceeds-maximizing contribution rate since their past contributions are sunk while they enjoy the tax proceeds from the current workers. As for the system's type, it is easy to see that they have the same preferences as a younger agent of the same characteristics. Allowing older people to vote then would not bring any new insight.
As usual, we proceed by backward induction and we …rst solve for the individual labor supply and saving decisions, before moving to the analysis of majority voting over the characteristics of the public system.
Individual choices of labor supply and saving
The …rst-order condition (FOC) with respect to private saving s is given by
The FOC with respect to labor supply z is
Using (2) and the fact that u 0 (x) > 0, equation (3) simpli…es to
measures the discounted value of the extra bene…t to which an individual is entitled when his tax contribution increases at the margin, net of its cost.
The sign of depends on the comparison between the gross individual marginal return of pension, =p; and the private saving return, 1 + r: If they are equal, is nil and the FOC for labor supply simpli…es to w = h 0 (z), so that the contribution rate does not a¤ect the labor supply decision. If =p < 1 + r, is negative and labor supply decreases with the tax rate, while a positive value of means that labor supply increases with . 11 In all cases, labor supply increases with both the share and return 1=p of the contributive part, since both increase the individuals'return from their own tax contributions. Labor supply is not a¤ected by individual or average survival probability, thanks to the absence of both income e¤ect in preferences (see (1) ) and of borrowing constraints. Labor supply increases with productivity w irrespective of the sign of .
The indirect utility (incorporating the optimal choices z and s of all individuals) is given by
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that the disutility of labor is given by
so that labor supply becomes
For future reference, note that cov(w 2 ; p) = Epw 2 pEw 2 ,p = p + cov(w 2 ; p) Ew 2 ;
so that increasing the covariance between life expectancy and productivity while keeping the marginal distributions of p and w unchanged increasesp and decreases the labor supply of all agents (when > 0), withp = p if cov(w 2 ; p) = 0, andp > p in the empirically relevant case where cov(w 2 ; p) > 0. Intuitively, if more productive agents live longer, the internal rate of return of the Bismarckian public annuity decreases below the Beveridgean return, and incentives to supply labor decrease as well.
We now study the joint determination by majority voting of the generosity and of the type of the pension system. We model the joint determination procedure …rst suggested independently by Kramer (1972) and Shepsle (1979) . A policy pair ( , ) is a Kramer- 4 Voting over the size of the pension system
We …rst study the …rst-order condition for the individual most-preferred value of , before turning to the majority chosen level. Di¤erentiating a voter's utility (5) with respect to while using (6) yields the following …rst-order condition
This condition also corresponds to the maximization of the individual's lifetime income-
i.e., (1 )wz + b=(1 + r): in the absence of borrowing constraints, individuals choose to maximize their discounted lifetime income (with labor supply z optimally chosen) and s to reach their optimal allocation across periods. 13 The …rst term of (8) The FOC (8) shows that an individual's most preferred level of depends on = w 2 Ew 2 :
Consequently, it is convenient to consider a type space over rather than w (with med < E = = 1 since w med < w). We denote by ( ; ) individual 's mostpreferred tax rate for any given value of .
We obtain the following proposition (proofs are relegated to the appendix). ii) if < 0 and < 1, ( ; ) is positive for = 0, decreases with and is zero above some productivity threshold level. Moreover, V ( ) = ( med ; ).
If the Bismarckian internal rate of return 1=p is large enough, compared with the private savings return, then the individual's discounted contributive part of the annuity increases more than his tax bill when the tax rate is increased (i.e., the …rst term of (8) is positive for any when > 0), even though only a part of the collective annuity is contributory. Moreover, increasing also a¤ects the non-contributory part of the pension: recall that labor supply is increasing in when > 0, so that the second term in (8) is also positive for any value of . This is the incentive e¤ect created by the Bismarckian part of the annuity on the return of the Beveridgean part. As the two terms of (8) are positive, all individuals favor = 1.
If < 0 and = 1, the pension system is purely contributive with a return lower than the interest rate. All agents then prefer saving to any positive amount of Bismarckian collective annuity.
There are then two conditions to be satis…ed for an individual to have an interior most-preferred size of the collective annuity program: that the system not be purely We now look at the choice of given , and then move to the Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium.
Voting over the type of the pension system
Assume for the time being that is given exogenously. We proceed as in the previous section, studying …rst the individually-optimal type of collective annuity, and then the majority-chosen one.
Di¤erentiating the utility function (5) with respect to while using (6) yields the following …rst-order condition
By the envelope theorem, the only …rst-order impact of on the utility of voters is via the induced variation of the collective annuity. The …rst term in (9) 
where p p < 0 < 2p p so that the …rst term is positive and the second term negative. The most-preferred value of increases with : the composition e¤ect of a larger value of (the …rst term in (9)) increases with the individual's productivity, while its incentive e¤ect on the Beveridgean tax base is independent of . Since preferences are single-peaked in , we can apply the median voter theorem to obtain that the majority voting value of is the one most-preferred by the median ability individual:
Equation (10) shows that the most-preferred value of increases with , because a higher increases the labor supply distortions generated by the non-contributive part of the annuity. We then obtain that the majority-chosen level of increases with as well.
We now move to the joint determination by majority voting of size and type of the pension system.
The Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium
Since the median productivity individual is decisive when voting both over given and over given , we obtain that KS = ( med ; KS ) and KS = ( med ; KS ).
We then obtain the following proposition. Intuitively these results can be explained as follows. Ifp is small, for instance because richer people do not have a (much) larger life expectancy than poorer people (see (7)), the contributive annuity's intrinsic return is large and the Bismarckian system is very attractive with a large contribution rate. The reason why a purely Bismarckian system is not always chosen is that the decisive individual bene…ts from redistribution, if her productivity is low enough, and thus favors the introduction of some non-contributive part in the collective annuity. Ifp is large (with richer people living much longer for instance), the contributive annuity has a low return and voters prefer a purely
Beveridgean system provided that the decisive voters' productivity is not too large. ii) Increasing average longevity when cov(w 2 ; p) = 0 has no impact on the size and type of a mostly Bismarckian system, but induces a shift to a purely Beveridgean system when a threshold is reached; it then decreases the equilibrium size of the pension program.
A larger cov(w 2 ; p) decreases the return of the contributive annuity and thus moves the Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium away from Bismarck. Note that, even though the covariance does not a¤ect the equilibrium size of the either mostly Bismarckian, or purely Beveridgean, program, a shift to pure Beveridge goes along with a discontinuous drop in the size of the program. In other words, increasing the correlation between income and longevity makes the equilibrium system more redistributive, without impacting directly its size (although a move to a purely Beveridgean system is accompanied by a lower size).
As for average longevity, our model predicts that it has no impact on the (size or type) of the equilibrium program when longevity is not correlated with income, as long as average longevity is low enough for the equilibrium program to be mostly Bismarckian. With the intrinsic returns of contributive and non-contributive systems equal by assumption (p = p), the equilibrium Bismarckian parameter is only a¤ected by the identity of the median voter, med (with a larger equilibrium KS as med increases and bene…ts less from the non-contributive annuity). As a threshold level is crossed, the equilibrium program becomes purely Beveridgean, with a size decreasing with average life expectancy (which decreases the return of the non-contributive annuity).
Numerical illustration
We perform two numerical calibrations, one for a Bismarckian country (France) and
another for a Beveridgean country (UK) and show that our model predicts an equilibrium which is in line with the stylized facts observed in reality. That France is mostly Bismarckian while the UK is mostly Beveridgean can be seen from Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007, Table 2 ), who show that the correlation between wage and pension is 0.268 for the UK (the lowest value among the 11 European countries reported in the Table) and 0.658 for France (the third largest value after Spain and Portugal, and larger than the value for Germany). 14 We …rst calibrate the distribution function of productivities. Since labor income is proportional to the square of productivity, we calibrate a lognormal distribution function of w 2 . We use the two degrees of freedom available in a lognormal distribution to replicate two facts about the country income distribution function: (1) an average income (gross annual wage in 2012 USD PPPs) of 39 600 for France and 44 222 for the UK, 15 and (2) a Gini coe¢ cient for the after-taxes and transfers distribution of 0.293
for France and 0.345 for the UK for the late 2000s. 16 We then obtain a median income 1 4 See also Cremer et al. (2000b) for additional evidence. 1 5 OECD data accessed at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_average_wage#OECD.27s_statistics on April 30, 2014 1 6 OECD data accessed at of 34 380 for France and of 36 200 for the UK, corresponding to med = 0:868 for France and 0.819 for the UK.
We then calibrate p, following the same procedure (and the same length periods) as We then calibrate the relationship between p and income w 2 . Bommier et al. (2005) estimates the elasticity of life expectancy to income for men at age 65 in France at 0.18.
We then use the CES functional form for this relationship, p(w 2 ) = p 0 (w 2 ) ;
with = 0:18: We then use the de…nition of average p, p = 1 Z 0 p 0 (w 2 ) dF (w 2 );
to obtain that p 0 = 0:21:
We proceed slightly di¤erently for the UK since we have not found estimates of the 3.4 percentage points". 18 We use this information, with the same CES functional form (11) , and the de…nition of p to calibrate equation (11) and we obtain that = 0:10 and that p 0 = 0:31:
We then obtain thatp = Epw 2 Ew 2 = 0:45 > p = 0:427 and corr(p; w 2 ) = 0:952 for France, witĥ p = Epw 2 Ew 2 = 0:469 > p = 0:45 and corr(p; w 2 ) = 0:92 for the UK.
We assume a real interest rate of 3.6% per year, with the amount of saving divided into 40 equal deposits made at the end of each working year. If i is the (constant)
interest rate (in real terms) paid each year, then we obtain the following formula (see Bronshtein et al., 2004) :
(1 + i) 40 1 i ;
with i = 3:6%, which yields r = 1: 16: 19 With these calibrations, we obtain thatp(1 + r) = 0:97 < 1 for France, consistent with the country being Bismarckian. More precisely, we obtain an equilibrium Bismarckian value of = 0:85. 20 As for the UK, we obtain thatp(1 + r) = 1:01 > 1, consistent with the country being Beveridgean. More precisely, we obtain an equilibrium Beveridgean value of = 16:9%. 21 We can use formula (7) to better understand why the return of a contributive system,p, is lower in the UK than in France: it is not due to the fact that the covariance between income and longevity is larger (on the contrary, it is smaller in the UK than in France, and moreover divided by a larger average wage in equation (7)) but rather because average life expectancy at 65 is larger in the UK.
We perform two comparative static exercises on this data. First, we examine how the political equilibrium is a¤ected when we increase the correlation between income and longevity without changing the average life expectancy p. This corresponds to the …rst part of Proposition 3. Since we know that Beveridgean countries are not a¤ected by such a move, we restrict our attention to France. More precisely, we increase the value of the elasticity of life expectancy to income in France, ; from the calibrated value of 0.18 and we report the corresponding political equilibrium in Table 1 . Increasing life expectancy while maintaining all other assumptions (including = 0:18) constant results in an increase in both p andp. As long as the increase in life expectancy is small, the political equilibrium remains Bismarckian, and the Bismarckian factor remains una¤ected (because the ratio of p andp remains constant with our calibration procedure when life expectancy at 65 is changed). Once a threshold life expectancy is reached (17.6 years with our calibrations), the equilibrium system becomes Beveridgean, with a much lower contribution rate. The Beveridgean equilibrium contribution rate decreases with life expectancy, as can be seen from Proposition 2 (iii).
As for the UK, the equilibrium pension system of course remains Beveridgean as life expectancy at 65 increases. The only impact of this variation is to decrease the majority chosen contribution rate (from 16.9% in the benchmark case to 16.2% when life expectancy at 65 increases from 18 to 18.2 years, for instance).
Conclusion
This paper has developed a model where individuals di¤er in productivity and in longevity (modeled as the probability to be alive in the second period of their life). Individuals decide how much to work and to save when young. They retire and consume their saving plus any pension bene…t when old. The public pension system takes the form of a collective annuity, with both a contributive (with the bene…t based on the worker's own contribution) and a non-contributive (based on the average contribution in the economy) component. Voters choose both the size or generosity of the system (measured by the payroll tax rate) and its type or degree of income redistribution (measured by the relative size of the non-contributory component).
We study the joint determination of both the size and type of pension system and show that the unique (Kramer-Shesple) equilibrium is either a large (mainly) Bismarckian system, a smaller (purely) Beveridgean pension, or no public pension at all. This equilibrium pattern corresponds to what is observed in reality, with larger Bismarckian than Beveridgean systems. Moreover, our model predicts which type of equilibrium should emerge given the characteristics of the income and longevity distributions and of their correlation. We calibrate the model to the situation of France and the UK and obtain a "large" Bismarckian system for France and a "small" Beveridgean system in the UK. Consequently, our model can contribute to explaining the stylized pattern of pension systems that is observed in reality.
Our analysis makes uses of two simplifying assumptions: we assume away borrowing constraints, so that saving can be negative, and we assume that the disutility from working can be expressed in consumption terms, independently of income. These two assumptions taken together simplify a lot the solving of the model, since preferences for collective annuities are made independent of individual longevity. The …rst of the two assumptions may strike the reader as especially strong, since it often (but not always) results in some voters favoring a con…scatory payroll tax (even in the presence of labor supply distortions from income taxation). The introduction of explicit borrowing constraints would complicate the model a lot without bringing much new insight. Spe-ci…cally, rather than favoring con…scatory tax rates, individuals would favor the largest value of the payroll tax consistent with non-negative saving. This would prevent people from favoring extremely large values of the payroll tax, but it would not a¤ect the qualitative results we have obtained in our simpler framework.
Finally, our political economy (median voter) model makes several assumptions that are common in that literature. These include for instance the hypotheses that voters are farsighted, sel…sh and vote directly on the characteristics of the pension systems, rather than for parties that propose pension policies bundled with many other policy dimensions. Additional insights would certainly be gained if these assumptions were lifted.
A Proof of Proposition 1 (i) The proof follows immediately from the FOC (8).
(ii) From (8), we obtain that (0; ) =p (1 + r) 2(p (1 + r) ) ;
which is positive when < 0 and < 1.
From (8), we also observe that ( ; ) decreases with when de…ned by (4) is negative. Furthermore, there exists a threshold value of such that people above this threshold most prefer = 0. We denote this threshold bỹ ii) Assume thatp(1 + r) < 1.
If med >p= p, ( med ; ) = 1 (all individuals with >p= p most prefer Bismarck whatever the value of ) and ( med ; 1) = 1, so that KS = 1 and KS = 1.
If med <p= p, there are two possible equilibria: ( = 0; > 0) and ( > 0; = 1).
-First candidate for equilibrium: ( = 0; > 0) If = 0, solving (8) with med = w 2 med =Ew 2 gives the majority chosen interior value of . Observe that med <p p < 1 p(1 + r) =~ (0); so that the majority chosen value of is positive. We then replace by this value in the …rst-order condition for given by equation (9), and we solve it for = 0 to obtain @V (0; ; ) @ = 1 +p(1 + r) p(1 + r)( 2 + p(1 + r) med ) ;
which is positive becausep(1 + r) < 1 and p(1 + r) med < 1, a contradiction with the assumption that = 0:
-Second candidate for equilibrium: ( > 0; = 1) If = 1, solving the …rst-order condition (10) for gives ( med ; 1) =p 2p p med 2 [1=2; 1] since med <p= p: We then replace by this value in the …rst-order condition for , and we evaluate it at = 1 to obtain @V (1; ; ) @ = 1 +p(1 + r) p(1 + r) 2 ( 2p + p med ) which is positive, con…rming that KS = 1.
iii and iv) Assume thatp(1 + r) > 1 and that KS = 0. From the FOC for measured at = 0, we infer that KS = 1 1 2 p(1 + r) med ; 25 which decreases with p(1 + r) med and is non-negative (and at most equal to 1/2) provided that p(1 + r) med < 1. Evaluating the FOC with respect to at this value of , we obtain @V ( ; ; w; p) @ = 1 p(1 + t) p(1 + r) ( which proves iv).
